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INTRODUCTION
In his 1980 State of the Union address, 
President Jimmy Carter introduced the now 
legendary “Carter Doctrine,” saying:
“Let our position be absolutely clear: 
An attempt by any outside force to 
gain control of the Persian Gulf region 
will be regarded as an assault on the 
vital interests of the United States 
of America, and such an assault will 
be repelled by any means necessary, 
including military force.”1
At the time, America was a significant 
importer of crude oil from the Gulf countries. 
The American public understood the need 
for U.S. military protection. Nowadays, 
however, U.S. military power underpins 
security for Gulf crude oil exports that 
increasingly flow to Asia. Indeed, the story 
told by physical oil flows is anything but 
Western-centric. Between 2000 and 2015, 
oil demand in North America and Europe 
grew by less than 0.2 million barrels per 
day (bpd), while East Asian demand grew 
by more than 52 times that amount. 
Unsurprisingly, Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) oil exporters have re-oriented exports 
toward Asia. For instance, in 2005, roughly 
50% of Saudi Aramco’s crude oil exports 
went to the Far East. By 2015, 65% of the 
company’s crude oil volumes headed east.2
 While Asian demand for Gulf crudes 
was growing rapidly, the shale boom helped 
decrease U.S. reliance on imported crude 
from nearly 70% of the total supply in 2007 
to just 35% by 2015 (Figure 1). Against this 
backdrop, some experts are now calling for 
Washington to reconsider the Carter Doctrine 
and America’s role as the preeminent military 
guarantor of Gulf oil exports.3
 Yet hard security in the Gulf remains 
firmly in the hands of the U.S. military, 
and to a lesser extent, key regional and 
Western allies. This brief argues that, despite 
changes in trade relations, America retains 
an enduring interest in preserving political 
stability and securing oil flows from the 
Persian Gulf. Washington continues to 
invest in regional security so that Gulf oil 
can securely and predictably find its way to 
refiners and consumer markets worldwide, 
be they in Beijing, Inchon, Rotterdam, 
Shanghai, Singapore, Tokyo—or Houston. 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE CARTER 
DOCTRINE SINCE 1980
The relationship between the United States 
and its Gulf allies has evolved in important 
ways since President Carter’s 1980 
declaration of America’s “vital interests” in 
the Persian Gulf. The Carter Doctrine’s first 
phase, which we label Carter Doctrine 1.0, 
was prompted by the convulsive events of 
1979-80, particularly the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution. 
Although U.S. physical dependence on 
Gulf oil supplies steadily declined between 
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decreasing import dependence, because 
Gulf oil is increasingly understood as an 
“economic good” that sustains the daily 
functioning of the global economy. As such, 
the risk posed by unfriendly or competitive 
forces in the region becomes all the more 
dangerous, since the globalized nature of oil 
market magnifies the effects of disruption. 
In addition, the same U.S. deployments 
that facilitate energy security are also 
indispensable for overseeing ongoing 
military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
increasingly active counterterrorism actions 
in Yemen, Syria, and the Horn of Africa, 
and other security activities in the region. 
While the United States appears to be 
less interested in large-scale, long-term 
occupations, its interests—and those of 
the global economy—continue to depend 
heavily on stability in the Gulf.
 As mentioned, U.S. oil production 
has reversed a nearly four-decade period 
of steady production declines and rising 
dependence on imports, while stimulating 
calls for a pullback from the Gulf. Even so, 
the United States still obtains more than 
10% of its total oil supply from the region—
mainly from Saudi Arabia, but also Kuwait 
and Iraq (Figure 2). 
 What might happen to U.S. fuel prices 
if the supply of oil from the Gulf were 
constrained? Global oil price benchmarks 
would quickly spike upward—and increased 
domestic production and the substitution 
of Canadian oil for OPEC imports would not 
insulate American consumers from the price 
spikes. This is because the global crude 
oil market now functions as a single pool. 
Changes in volume quickly translate into 
movements in price no matter where the 
outage takes place. In short, U.S. economic 
security remains tied to stability in the 
Persian Gulf, albeit less directly than in 
the past. Further, a complex web of global 
trade linkages closely ties U.S. economic 
activity to the financial and industrial health 
of the Asia-Pacific region. Since exports of 
Gulf oil are a key feedstock for East Asia’s 
expansion, they effectively remain indirect 
catalysts to growth in the U.S. economy. 
1980 and 1986 as non-OPEC oil production 
boomed, U.S. policymakers feared that Soviet 
penetration into the region would allow 
Moscow to use threats to oil supplies as a tool 
for coercing the United States and its allies. In 
practice, the doctrine resulted in an increase 
in forces in the region, but prior to Iraq’s 
1990 invasion of Kuwait, U.S. forces generally 
operated from afar, or “over the horizon.” 
 Carter Doctrine 2.0 came about 
alongside the demise of the bipolar system 
of competitive international blocs and the 
rise of non-state threats manifested in 
the Sept. 11 attacks. Indeed, the U.S.-led 
Gulf War of 1990-91 marked the beginning 
of a larger, more permanent U.S. military 
presence in the region. Between 1991 and 
1994, U.S. forces gained access to military 
bases in all six GCC countries.5 This more 
hegemonic phase involved forceful intrusion, 
first into Iraqi-occupied Kuwait in 1991, and 
a decade later, into Afghanistan and Iraq. 
 In the present-day version, Carter 
Doctrine 3.0, U.S. security policy remains 
focused on the Gulf region despite 
SOURCES  BP Statistical Review of Energy 2016,4 authors’ analysis
FIGURE 1 — RELATIVE SHIFTS IN U.S. AND CHINESE DEPENDENCE 
ON CRUDE OIL IMPORTS
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WHY WASHINGTON IS LIKELY TO 
CONTINUE UPHOLDING THE CARTER 
DOCTRINE
While the United States (and Europe) and 
Asia have traded places as the leading 
volumetric destinations for Gulf crude, at 
least six factors suggest that maintaining 
the Carter Doctrine remains very much 
in the U.S. national interest. First, Saudi 
Arabia remains the single largest supplier 
of oil to the world, providing about 13% 
of global supply between 1992 and 2015 
(Figure 3). Moreover, the kingdom is the 
only producer in the world with the spare 
oil output capacity to cover the outage 
of a medium-sized supplier. And, as of 
today, no conceivable combination of 
producers could make up for a significant 
loss of Saudi oil in the short-run. An outage 
in the kingdom could trigger a globally 
destabilizing economic crisis.
 Second, America’s growing oil self-
sufficiency does not make it “independent” 
of the Middle East or the effects of an oil 
market disruption. Political stability in the 
Gulf will remain a determinant of U.S. oil 
and refined product prices no matter how 
little we import, as long as the Gulf states 
remain key exporters and as long as oil 
remains the dominant fuel for land, sea, and 
air transport. Because U.S. producers can 
now export crude oil, domestic prices would 
remain tightly linked to prices abroad even if 
the U.S. entirely ceased importing crude oil.
 Third, having a dominant power 
overseeing the global maritime commons—a 
Pax Americana—fundamentally underpins 
the global trading system for oil and other 
goods.6 U.S. national security strategy has 
for 30 years consistently—and in a bipartisan 
manner—accorded high importance to 
ensuring the free flow of energy supplies 
into the global market. If anything, the U.S. 
view of its oil supply security role in the Gulf 
region has expanded over time. The Reagan 
administration’s 1987 National Security 
Strategy deemed ensuring “the United States 
and its allies and friends access to foreign 
energy and mineral resources” as a major 
objective. By 2015, President Barack Obama’s 
administration noted that “energy market 
SOURCES  U.S. Energy Information Administration, Baker Institute Center for Energy Studies
FIGURE 2 — KEY GULF OIL SUPPLIERS (KUWAIT, IRAN, IRAQ, 
QATAR, SAUDI, UAE) AS % OF TOTAL U.S. CRUDE OIL SUPPLY 
SOURCE  BP Statistical Review of World Energy
FIGURE 3 — SAUDI ARABIA'S (AND OPEC’S) SHARE OF GLOBAL OIL 
SUPPLY HAS REMAINED ROUGHLY CONSTANT SINCE 1991 
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IF WASHINGTON SCALED BACK, 
COULD CHINA STEP IN?
The election of Donald Trump and the 
subsequent unclear direction of U.S. 
foreign policy have generated uncertainty 
around Washington’s commitment to 
overseeing the global maritime commons. 
The uncertainty has given rise to questions 
about China’s capacity to stand in for the 
United States. Although China has bolstered 
its forces in the region, the evidence argues 
against a major Gulf security role for China 
anytime soon. 
Current Chinese Military Presence and 
Recent Operations in the Region
In 2008, the Chinese navy dispatched its 
first anti-piracy task force to the seas off 
the Horn of Africa. By March 2017, China had 
rotated 25 escort task forces through the 
area.8 Since 2009, Chinese naval vessels 
involved in anti-piracy operations have 
made at least 79 port visits in and near the 
Gulf, mainly in Oman and Djibouti.
 China’s forward military presence has 
allowed it to begin staging limited, albeit 
unprecedented, security operations. As 
Libya descended into political violence 
in the spring of 2011, the Chinese missile 
frigate Xuzhou left the Gulf of Aden anti-
piracy task force and travelled through the 
Suez Canal to support the evacuation of 
Chinese nationals from Libya.9 The Chinese 
air force also sent IL-76 transport aircraft 
to evacuate Chinese nationals trapped in 
Libya’s interior.10
 In 2014, the frigate Yanchang, also 
engaged in counter-piracy in the Gulf of 
Aden, headed to the Mediterranean to escort 
a shipment of Syrian chemical weapons 
bound for destruction under a multi-national 
deal.11 In 2015, Chinese naval vessels also 
helped evacuate Chinese and other foreign 
residents threatened by civil war in Yemen. 
 These missions suggest China’s navy 
may maintain a presence near the Gulf. 
Perhaps the clearest sign comes from 
Beijing’s construction of a military base in 
Djibouti, where port facilities have played a 
central role in supporting the Gulf of Aden 
anti-piracy deployment.12 The base marks a 
disruptions” were among the “top strategic 
risks” to U.S. national interests and that it 
was a high priority to “ensure the free flow 
of energy from the [Middle East and North 
Africa] region to the world.”7
 Fourth, no nation-state can credibly 
replace America’s provision of external 
security in the Gulf and the strategic Strait of 
Hormuz, through which flows approximately 
20% of globally traded oil and an even 
larger portion of global LNG supplies. Neither 
Russia nor China nor any combination of 
European powers has the force projection or 
logistics capacity to assume the task. China, 
in particular, could gain a greater sense of 
strategic security from overseeing its own 
oil trade. However, as we show in the next 
section, China is not physically prepared to 
carry out the mission. 
 Fifth, while the strength of once weak 
Gulf militaries has improved in the past 
decade and most have equipment that is 
interoperable with U.S. forces, these militaries 
are generally not structured to prevail in 
external conflicts. Rather, they are often 
deliberately structured so that they do not 
pose an internal threat to family-based rule. 
It is also uncertain as to whether the various 
Gulf states—including Iran—could form and 
maintain a coalition to maintain oil and gas 
supplies and transit security absent a major 
U.S. presence in the area.
 Sixth, even if China or Russia—or some 
coalition—were capable of guaranteeing 
hard security for Gulf oil producers and the 
sea lanes used to bring their resources to 
market, it is doubtful that Washington would 
volunteer to relinquish its role. The United 
States accrues numerous strategic benefits 
from its military ties to Gulf regimes and 
maintaining U.S. forces on bases around the 
region. These include supporting U.S. ground 
forces, conducting counterterror raids and 
surveillance, and maintaining the aircraft and 
unmanned drones operating in the area. 
 Finally, the departure of the U.S. 
without a handoff to an allied power would 
potentially leave the region vulnerable to 
takeover by a hegemonic state or non-state 
actor. This could be a current power in the 
region, such as Iran, an external actor such 
as Russia, or a new regime created by the 
overthrow of an existing state.
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watershed moment in China’s internal debate 
regarding the forward placement of military 
forces. Chinese interests and diplomatic 
confidence have expanded to the point where 
Beijing can maintain a permanent naval 
presence that need not be rationalized by 
Somali piracy. 
Future Trajectory of China’s Military 
Presence in the Region
While it appears the Chinese presence in 
the region will endure, it is worth noting 
the following realities: First, China’s 
primary area of strategic focus is the Gulf 
of Aden, which lies more than 1,000 miles 
from the Strait of Hormuz. Second, China’s 
force level in the region does not begin to 
compare to the presence maintained by the 
U.S, which has access to at least 15 bases in 
and near the region, and which can sustain 
full-scale combat operations—and perhaps 
as importantly—has been granted authority 
by host nations to conduct combat 
operations from many of those bases. 
Indeed, China maintains just two or three 
vessels in the region.13
 If China chose to assume a more 
proactive posture that moved beyond 
“showing the flag” and sought to supplant 
the U.S. Navy, it would face several 
constraints. Securing a key portion of the 
global commons is an expensive exercise 
that the Chinese defense budget might not 
be able to bear, especially given the high 
costs of Chinese domestic security and the 
recent slowdown in economic growth.14 
 At present, China reaps the benefits 
of making maritime security deployments 
while drafting in the substantial wake of the 
U.S. Navy. If China were to try and fill the 
vacuum created by a U.S. pullback, it would 
bear huge costs. As Barry Posen of MIT notes 
in his seminal work on the military aspects 
of the global commons:
The specific weapons and platforms 
needed to secure and exploit command 
of the commons are expensive. They 
depend on a huge scientific and 
industrial base for their design and 
production … The development of 
new weapons and tactics depends on 
decades of expensively accumulated 
technological and tactical experience 
embodied in the institutional memory of 
public and private military research and 
development organizations. Finally, the 
military personnel needed to run these 
systems are among the most highly 
skilled and highly trained in the world. 
The barriers to entry to a state seeking 
the military capabilities to fight for the 
commons are very high.15
Further, assuming the lead position as the 
guarantor of Gulf oil security could provoke 
opposition from the same groups—including 
Islamist factions—unhappy with the U.S. 
presence. Chinese investment in parts of 
Africa has triggered violent reactions in 
multiple countries. Military deployments 
could be more inflammatory.
 The missions Chinese naval and 
air forces have conducted in the Gulf 
region to date are those in which their 
involvement consists primarily of “showing 
up.” Suppressing piracy, evacuating 
SOURCES  China Military Online, The National (UAE), Xinhua News Agency
FIGURE 4 — CHINESE NAVY PORT VISITS IN THE GULF AND KEY 
ADJACENT REGIONS SINCE FEBRUARY 2009
4 visits or less 5–7 visits 8 visits More than 20 visits
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While other countries, including China, have 
begun to assume small roles in securing 
parts of the energy transit sea lanes, the 
United States remains the sole nation-state 
with sufficient military force-projection 
and logistics capacity to both underpin the 
broader regional security structures and 
ensure safe passage of maritime trade. 
America will likely strive to remain the 
region’s preeminent military power because 
of the vital importance of oil and gas to 
the world economy and a stable system of 
global trade. 
 Accordingly, U.S. policymakers should 
redouble efforts to ensure that American 
voters and their elected representatives 
understand the importance of continued 
engagement in the Gulf. The U.S. economy 
remains highly exposed to events in the 
region that would be transmitted through 
changes in oil supply and pricing. Looked 
at another way, by ensuring the continued 
stability of a small but critical portion of 
the globe, the U.S. security umbrella pays 
disproportionate dividends in helping 
provide steady energy flows to underwrite 
continued U.S. and global prosperity. 
 The uncertainty and populist rhetoric 
now coloring U.S. politics and foreign 
policy have led observers to question 
the continuity of the U.S. presence in 
the Gulf. We believe that the lack of a 
single threatening strategic competitor 
makes justifying the expense of the 
Carter Doctrine more difficult for U.S. 
policymakers, but the benefits of the 
policy are more widespread, mirroring 
the globalization process that has linked 
American economic security to that of 
the rest of the world. The Carter Doctrine 
may have entered a new 3.0 phase, but it 
remains as compelling now as in 1980. 
citizens, and escorting shipments of 
chemical weapons being removed from 
Syria are low-complexity missions with 
a disproportionately large diplomatic 
payoff. Missions that might be required of a 
dominant power—such as suppressing non-
state actors using anti-ship missiles near a 
strategic strait—are more complicated and 
carry higher risks.16
Japanese and South Korean Regional Naval 
Operations
What about the other East Asian powers? 
Japan and South Korea have both deployed 
vessels to Combined Task Force 151, the 
multinational anti-piracy mission off 
Somalia. Japan’s vessels have conducted 
hundreds of escort missions involving 
more than 3,000 ships.17 These U.S. allies 
could take a limited role in overseeing oil 
shipments through the Strait of Hormuz.
 However, Japan and South Korea are 
likely to remain reluctant to do so unless they 
are either part of a multinational task force or 
operating in conjunction with the U.S. Navy. 
In addition, Washington probably prefers that 
Japan and South Korea, both U.S. treaty allies, 
keep their interoperable naval forces in the 
East Asian region to act as a strategic force 
multiplier in case of a conflict there.
CONCLUSION
The circumstances that gave rise to 
the 1980 Carter Doctrine have changed 
substantially. The Cold War threat 
embodied by Soviet encroachment has 
dissipated. U.S. imports of Gulf oil have 
waned, while those of East Asia have 
grown dominant. Through all these 
changes, however, Gulf oil has retained its 
strategic importance. Threats to stable oil 
flows may have evolved, but they persist. 
We argue that, while some aspects of 
current circumstances might augur for 
a scaling back of U.S. commitments, a 
future crisis could force the U.S. and its 
allies to reconstruct security architecture 
at a cost likely much greater than that 
of maintaining and adapting the existing 
framework.
Having a dominant 
power overseeing 
the global maritime 
commons— 
a Pax Americana—
fundamentally 
underpins the global 
trading system for oil 
and other goods.
By ensuring the 
continued stability 
of a small but critical 
portion of the globe, the 
U.S. security umbrella 
pays disproportionate 
dividends in helping 
provide steady energy 
flows to underwrite 
continued U.S. and 
global prosperity. 
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